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This memorandum explores the circumstances surrounding Fifth Amendment waivers in
United States courts, such as the bankruptcy courts. Part I examines how long a person has to
assert their Fifth Amendment right before it is considered waived. Part II describes what actions
an individual can take within that timeframe that would affirmatively waive the privilege. If
either form of waiver occurs, a witness will be required to turn over incriminating information.

I.

What Constitutes a “Timely Manner” in Regard to Fifth Amendment Waivers?

The Fifth Amendment provides “purely a personal privilege of the witness.”7 The
Amendment does not protect a witness from testifying voluntarily.8 Consequently, a defendant
“must claim it or he will not be considered to have been ‘compelled’” to testify under the
language of the Amendment.9 The exact amount of time a person has to assert their Fifth
Amendment privilege after being asked to testify has not been set. Instead, the Supreme Court
has recognized three potential instances where the waiver might occur that supplant the need for
an absolute timeframe. The first occurs when the Fifth Amendment assertion is merely an
afterthought. The second is when the asserter has been given immunity for the crimes. The third
is whether the waiver has been statutorily applied. However, these occasions are also buttressed
by a “good-faith” assessment, which seeks to preserve the rights of those who may have
inadvertently waived for good reason.

7

Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906)).
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
9
Id.
8
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A) Invoking the Fifth Amendment as a Back-Up Plan May Yield a Waiver.

The Supreme Court first recognized the possibility of waiving the Fifth Amendment
privilege as an afterthought in United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration.10
In Vajtauer, the refusal to testify was originally based upon a “supposed right of the witness not
to be called upon to testify until all the evidence in support of the warrant was presented. . . .”11
However, because the witness refused to testify, his silence was used against him in a
deportation claim. On appeal, the Court held that since “he did not assert his privilege or in any
manner suggest that he withheld testimony because there was any ground for fear of selfincrimination,” his assertion of the Fifth Amendment was evidently an afterthought.12 Thus, his
privilege was waived.13 However, while finding a claim to be an afterthought creates a brightline-rule applicable to all cases, it is hard to determine whether privilege is an afterthought
outside of a case to case basis.
For example, in Rogers v. United States the Court held that the treasurer of the
Communist Party of Denver had waived her Fifth Amendment Privilege when refusing to turn
over the books and records of the party.14 The treasurer declined to divulge, first out of courtesy
for those in the Party, but later asserted her privilege before the presiding district court.15 In that
case, the Supreme Court reasoned that since she had “expressly placed her original declination to
answer on an untenable ground . . . , [the] desire to protect others from punishment,” she had
waived her privilege.16 Further, the Court upheld the waiver despite evidence that the Treasurer
only asserted the privilege after hearing it come up in a prior case, suggesting that she did not

10

273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927).
Id. at 111-12.
12
Id. at 113.
13
Id.
14
340 U.S. at 368.
15
Id. at 368-69.
16
Id. at 371.
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know of its function.17 Therefore, providing a prior untenable ground waives the privilege
regardless of a person’s knowledge that the privilege exists.
Additionally, failing to bring the attention of the court to the Fifth Amendment assertion,
such as waiting to use it until the last possible second, waives the privilege.18 This was the case
in Reid v. Wolf, a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, held a third party in default after that third party denied adhering to
a motion to compel issued by the trustee in discovery.19 The court noted that “the circumstances
coloring [the third party’s] invocation of the privilege [had] not changed in any material way”
following a prior opportunity to assert the privilege.20 In that instance, the court found this
“eleventh hour invocation” was an attempt at “dilatorily engaging in procedural gamesmanship”
in a similar way to providing untenable grounds.21 Therefore, the defendant waived his privilege
by failing to assert it at an earlier opportunity.
B) Accepting Immunity Removes the Applicability of the Fifth Amendment.

Waivers of the Fifth Amendment are also found through immunity. Because the Fifth
Amendment only protects an individual from revealing statements that would subject them to
criminal proceedings, “if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to
apply.”22 This sort of waiver would occur, for example, when a person is compelled to testify
about an act that they committed as a child, which would have been a criminal act had the statute
of limitations not passed.23

Id. at 370 n. 4 (“I’m a very honest person and I’m not acquainted with the tricks of legal procedure, but I
understand from the reading of these cases this morning that . . . I do have a right to refuse to answer. . . .”).
18
See United States ex rel. Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 113.
19
Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf), Case No.14 B 27066, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1549 at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 24, 2018).
20
Id. at *11 (finding that the asserting party’s lack of credibility throughout the trial negated any claims that he had
become aware of potentially incriminating evidence after an original motion to compel).
21
See generally id. at *14.
22
Hale, 201 U.S. at 67.
23
See id.
17
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If the witness is unsure about whether the information has lost its incriminating value,
they can ask the court whether the testimony would amount to incrimination prior to it being
given.24 Judicial oversight of the Fifth Amendment claim establishes that “the privilege may not
be relied on and must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention of
the tribunal. . . .”25 Ultimately, the protection of judicial oversight creates a “use-it-or-lose-it”
situation for potential testifiers.
C) Waivers of the Fifth Amendment Can be Imposed Through Statute.

The final instance where timing bars the assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege is when
a statute sets the time limit for objections. In Davis v. Fendler, a statutory time limit was
discussed as set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, a person who was
compelled to interrogatories waived their privilege by not objecting within the time frame set by
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33.26 Rule 33 states that objectors to an interrogatory “must
serve [their] answers and any objections within 30 days after being served . . . .”27 The Fendler
Court held that procedural time limits “constitute[] a waiver of any objection. . . even of an
objection that the information sought is privileged.”28
Statutory waivers have similarly been recognized by bankruptcy courts. In American
Eagle Bank v. Friedman (In re Friedman), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, found a statutory waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 36.29 While Rule 36 does not contain the untimely objections result

24

See United States ex rel. Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 113.
Id.
26
650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981).
27
Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) (allowing for a shorter or longer time to be stipulated by the court).
28
Fendler, 650 F.2d at 1160 (citing United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Ill. 1975)).
29
543 B.R. 833, 843 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. 2015).
25
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found in Rule 33, courts have interpreted Rule 36 to have that condition.30 In that case, the debtor
failed to raise the Fifth Amendment within that thirty-day period, and thus waived his privilege.31
Lastly, any objection brought to the court within the bounds of the statutory limit should
be plain enough for the court to understand why they are objectionable, leaving the court free to
request additional information.32 Judicial deference in this sense is in line with the oversight
protections within waivers by immunity and help assure that the Fifth Amendment is being
properly asserted.
D) The Protections of Good Faith May Protect from Inadvertent Waivers.

Despite the three aforementioned occasions, courts are generally lenient in finding
waivers. This is because “such a ‘testimonial waiver’ is not to be lightly inferred, and the courts
accordingly indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a testimonial waiver.”33 For
these reasons, the Supreme Court in Maness v. Meyers held that a lawyer could not be held in
contempt for advising his clients to claim Fifth Amendment privilege so long as there was a good
faith reason behind it.34 Therefore, if a person has a good-faith basis for the delay, the court may
allow them to retain their Fifth Amendment privilege for some time.

II.

What Constitutes a Waiver of the Fifth Amendment Privilege by Action?

Turning to the second source of waiver, consenting to provide the material that the
privilege is being asserted for, the Second Circuit has suggested the use of a two-element test for
oral testimonies.35 First, if a witness begins to testify and then stops, the court should ask if the

30

Id. (citations omitted) (noting that Rule 36 requires a respondent to answer or object within 30 days).
Id. at 844.
32
Fendler, 650 F.2d at 1160.
33
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 (1955)); see
also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949).
34
419 U.S. at 468.
35
See Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d at 287.
31
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witness’ prior statements create a “significant likelihood” that the finder of fact will be left with a
distorted view of the truth.36 Second, the court should assess if the witness had a reason to know
that their prior statements would be a waiver of their privilege.37 The test in Klein has been
followed by the Eighth Circuit and lower trial and bankruptcy courts throughout the nation.38
Applying this test provides lower courts with guidance on how to deal with the sensitive issue of
waivers.
A) Determining Whether the Truth Has Been Distorted.

The first prong of the test, whether affirming the privilege would leave the fact finder
with a distorted view of the truth, stems from the statements of Judge Learned Hand, who wrote,
“the privilege is to suppress the truth, but that does not mean that it is a privilege to garble it. . .
.”39 The Supreme Court affirmed this in Rogers, holding that to provide otherwise would “open
the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the
testimony.”40 However, determining that a statement has left the facts distorted should only be
inferred in the most compelling of circumstances.41 For example, in Klein the court held that the
first prong was satisfied when a witness recanted their willingness to testify after discussing the
circumstances of a crime before the jury.42 This left the jury with a distorted view of the truth, as
they now had the basis of the situation, but not the conclusion.43

36

Id.
Id.
38
See e.g., United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 241 (8th Cir. 1986); Thorne v. Loews Phila. Hotel, Inc., No. 153837, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97832 at *12 (E.D. Penn. 2016); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, No. 12-175, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63649 at *14-15 (E.D. La 2012); In re Stoecker, 103 B.R. 182, 187 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. M&M Petroleum Servs., No. 07-818, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106045 at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
39
United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942).
40
340 U.S. at 371.
41
Klein, 667 F.2d at 288.
42
Id. at 287-88.
43
See id. at 288.
37
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However, meeting the “distorted view of the truth” factor does not create a waiver if the
case does not go to a finder of fact.44 The “finder of fact” is determined by who assesses the
provided facts to reach a conclusion.45 For example, trustees in bankruptcy cases are finders of
facts for depositions in discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 because the trustee is
attempting to gather information to determine the assets of the debtor.46 Further, if the final
determination of a case is not made by a finder of fact, such as through settlement, this prong of
the Klein test is found in favor of the privilege-asserting party.47 However, if the case is reopened then the waiver will stand.48

B) Determining Whether the Witness Has Knowledge of the Waiver.

The second prong of the test – whether the witness should have known that they had
waived the privilege – provides a more objective calculation. Where the first prong only requires
a court to determine if the fact finder would be left shorthanded, the second prong asks whether
the witness’ statements were both “testimonial” and “incriminating.”49 Testimonial means that
the statements were voluntarily made under oath in the context of the same judicial proceeding.50
In assessing whether a case is in the same proceeding, at least one court has suggested that in

44

In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. at 163 (citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Jupiter Dev. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 110, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
45
See Id. at 164.
46
Id.
47
See Maguire & Co. Inc. v. Margolies (In re Candor Diamond Corp.), 42 B.R. 916, 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1984)
(finding that a waiver would have occurred had the case not ended in a default judgement).
48
In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. at 163 (discussing the circumstances of In re Candor Diamond Corp.).
49
Id.
50
See United States v. O’Henry’s Film Works, Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 317-19 (2d. Cir. 1979) (statements must be
voluntary); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 821 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (statements must be in the same
proceeding); E. F. Hutton & Co., 91 F.R.D. at 114 (statements must be under oath).
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bankruptcy cases testimony given at a section 341(a) meeting is not a waiver in later adversary
proceedings.51
Further, incriminating means that they “did not merely deal with matters ‘collateral’ to
the events surrounding commission of the crime.”52 For a court to find a waiver, the asserting
party “must have already provided testimony that in and of itself is incriminating and that is
specific to the topic where the questioner wants additional detail.”53 In In re Yates, a chapter 7
case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California upheld the
denial of the United States Trustee’s motion to compel interrogatory responses against a debtor
who asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege.54 Prior to his case being previously discharged, the
debtor, in a section 341(a) hearing, had answered “no” to the question “do you now or have you
had in the past, any interests in offshore accounts . . . ?”55 After discharge, the trustee came into
possession of evidence that the debtor did have offshore accounts and determined that the
discharge should be reconsidered.56 The trustee issued interrogatories asking about offshore
accounts, to which the debtor asserted his Fifth Amendment Privilege.57 The court found that the
previous statements did not cause a waiver because there is nothing but circumstantial evidence
to suggest that they are untrue.58 Therefore, the burden of showing a waiver falls to the party
demanding the testimony.59

51

See Krasney v. Nam (In re Nam), 245 B.R. 216, 233 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); see also In re Yates, No. 04-05619,
2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4406 at *26 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2008) (stating that testimony requested through interrogatories
are a continuation of the 341(a) meeting’s testimony for purposes of finding waiver in either part of the trial).
52
Klein, 667 F.2d at 288.
53
In re Yates, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS at *28.
54
See id. at *42.
55
Id. at *2.
56
Id. at *6.
57
Id. at *9.
58
Id. at *34-35 (stating that the first prong of Klein also fails if there is no past incriminating statement, regardless of
potential confusion to the finder of fact).
59
See generally id. at *35 (stating that the trustee must have provided definitive evidence that the trustee voluntarily
made a prior incriminating statement).
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But when these factors are met, the witness “plainly has reason to know . . . that these
statements may be interpreted as a waiver of his fifth amendment [sic.] privilege. . . .”60 This
second “consent” prong does not only apply to oral testimony, but also to documents requested
under judicial proceedings. However, both factors come with some measure of discretion. Where
some trial level courts have held documents to be waived by a temporal-waiver, such as a
statutory waiver, other trial level courts have made exceptions for the assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege.61 One example is in In re Kave,62 where the Massachusetts District Court
found that the failure to assert privilege was not fatal in cases where it did not cause undue delay,
despite having agreed to produce the material already.63
On the contrary, where undue delay is caused, the waiver will be found.64 In SEC v.
TelexFree, Inc. the Massachusetts district courts found that a defendant’s assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege was barred because they had already agreed to an order to provide
accounting, had negotiated in creating the language of the order with the SEC, and had been
represented by counsel.65 As compared to Day, these two cases show the courts’ reluctance to
allow dilatory tactics despite a potentially valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment.

CONCLUSION
Waivers of the Fifth Amendment can produce monumental changes in litigation,
requiring the potential disclosure of material that would otherwise remain confidential.
Therefore, litigants should be conscious of when a waiver may occur. Also, the chance to waive

60

Klein, 667 F.2d at 288.
See Day v. Boston Edison Co., 150 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D. Mass. 1993).
62
760 F.2d 343, 353 n. 22 (1st Cir. 1985).
63
Day, 150 F.R.D. at 21.
64
In re Wolf, No. 17-27066, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1549 at *14.
65
164 F. Supp. 3d 187, 192-93 (D. Mass. 2015).
61
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through agreement to testify, whether the privileged material was known or not, should be
recognized by litigants as they prepare for trial. While the presiding judge may have
discretionary control over what is privileged, observant litigants may be able to withhold, or
introduce, potentially incriminating evidence through diligent observation of consent. Finally,
“dilatory tactics” or gamesmanship on either side results in waivers of the privilege, and possibly
sanctions or contempt charges. The Fifth Amendment Privilege is there to protect individuals
from divulging potentially harmful information, however, it is ultimately a privilege, and
privileges can be lost.

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

